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Why Same-Sex Spouses Should Be
Granted Preferential Immigration Status:
Reevaluating Adams v. Howerton
I. INTRODUCTION
Pat is a citizen of Denmark. Lee is a citizen of the United
States and a resident of Hawaii. They marry legally in Denmark
and want to live together in the United States. Ordinarily, this
would raise no legal dilemma. As the spouse of a U.S. citizen, Pat
would be entitled to become a legal permanent resident of the
United States.' But what if Lee and Pat are both men, or both
women? In either case, whether Pat is entitled to become a legal
permanent resident is unclear.
At present, no U.S. state permits people of the same sex to
marry. Nevertheless, many states have recently expanded the
rights granted to homosexuals. In Hawaii, for example, the
Supreme Court recently held that to deny homosexuals the right
to marry may violate that state's Equal Rights Amendment.2
Additionally, although no U.S. state permits same-sex
marriages, they are recognized by some foreign countries, including
Denmark and Norway.3 Thus, an American citizen can have a
valid same-sex marriage to a foreign citizen under foreign law.
This, however, can lead to problems because a state court in the
United States may not recognize that foreign marriage as valid.
Current U.S. law does not recognize a same-sex spouse as a
"spouse" for immigration purposes. Thus, while a party to a
heterosexual marriage can gain his or her spouse's entry into the
United States by virtue of the valid marriage, the spouse of a
homosexual is denied that opportunity.
This Note will examine how U.S. courts currently approach
this issue within the framework of the leading case, Adams v.
1. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 1992).
2. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 49-60 and accompanying text.
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Howerton.4 The first Section delineates the Adams decision. The
second Section argues that a same-sex marriage can be valid under
state law, meeting the first part of the test established in Adams.
The third Section argues that a valid same-sex marriage is
sufficient under the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") to
confer "spouse" status on a same-sex spouse, meeting the second
part of the test established in Adams. The fourth Section
concludes that, under existing law, same-sex spouses should be
treated the same as opposite-sex spouses for immigration purposes.
A. The Federal Court Approach
1. The Factual Basis of Adams v. Howerton
In Adams v. Howerton, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
faced a situation similar to the hypothetical above.' Adams, an
American male, and Sullivan, an Australian male, obtained a
marriage license in Colorado, where they participated in a
marriage ceremony with a minister in 1975.6 Adams petitioned
the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") to classify
Sullivan, his spouse, as the immediate relative of an American
citizen under 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b).7 The INS denied the petition,
and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the denial.8
Adams and Sullivan filed an action in the U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California to challenge the administrative
decision.9 They claimed that they were married to each other,
that each was the other's spouse under state and federal law, and
that the law was unconstitutional under the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
extent that it deprived them of their marital status.1°
The district court held that Adams and Sullivan were not
legally married under state law, and that even if the state law
recognized the marriage, Congress did not intend to recognize such
4. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982)
[hereinafter Adams 1H].
5. Id.
6. Adams v. Howerton, 486 F Supp. 1119, 1120 (C.D. Cal. 1980) [hereinafter Adams
I].
7. Adams II, 673 F.2d at 1038.
8. Id.




a relationship.1  The court also rejected the constitutional
challenges.
2
2. Sullivan Fails the Court of Appeal's TWo-Part Test for
Qualification as a Spouse for Immigration Purposes
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision 3
and established a two-part test for determining whether a marriage
will be recognized for immigration purposes: first, the court asks
whether the marriage is valid under state law; and, second, the
court determines whether the state-approved marriage qualifies
under the INA. 4 In the Adams case, the court found it unneces-
sary to determine whether Colorado would recognize a same-sex
marriage 5 because the court found that the second part of the
test was not met.
In applying the second part of the test, the court first acknowl-
edged Congress' plenary power in the area of federal immigration,
stating that "so long as Congress acts within constitutional con-
straints, it may determine the conditions under which immigration
visas are issued. Therefore, the intent of Congress governs the
conferral of spouse status under section 201(b) [of the INA], and
a valid marriage is determinative only if Congress so intends.'
16
The court then found that Congress did not intend for same-
sex marriages to qualify under the INA. It examined who may be
considered a "spouse" for purposes of the Act, citing Section 101
of the Act, which provides that the term "spouse" does not apply
to persons who were not in each other's physical presence during
the marriage ceremony, unless the marriage is consummated. 7
The court also noted that valid marriages entered into by persons
"not intending to live together as husband and wife are not
11. Id. at 1123-24.
12. Id at 1025.
13. Adams II, 673 F.2d at 1036.
14. Id. at 1038. In In re Gamero, 14 I. & N. Dec. 674 (B.I.A. 1974), the Board of
Immigration Appeals noted that the validity of a marriage is governed by the law of the
place where the marriage was celebrated. Id. The Board also noted, however, that even
if a marriage is legally valid where celebrated, it "is not invariably recognized as sufficient
to confer immigration benefits. Immigration benefits will not be granted in cases where the
couple has not established a bona fide subsisting marital relationship." Id. at 676.
15. Adams II, 673 F.2d at 1039.
16. Id.
17. Id. (discussing then-applicable INA § 101(a)(35)).
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recognized for immigration purposes.""8  The court concluded
that a marriage that is valid under state law does not necessarily
confer spouse status under the Act. 9
Applying this analysis to the facts, the court determined that
Congress did not intend for homosexual marriages to confer
spouse status under the INA. In doing so, the court found that
marriage is ordinarily a status granted to two persons of the
opposite sex.' Thus, in the absence of evidence of contrary
intent by Congress, the word "marriage" should be given its
"ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.",21  The court also
noted that to recognize homosexual marriages for immigration
purposes would contradict Congress' stated intent to exclude
homosexuals from admission into the United States by categorical-
ly excluding "sexual deviates. ' 22
3. The Court Rejects the Plaintiff's
Fourteenth Amendment Claims
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amend-
ment claims.' Recognizing its limited power of review over
Congress' decisions to admit or exclude aliens, because of
Congress' "almost" plenary power in this area, the court declined
to apply a strict standard of review.' Without discussing why
Congress did not extend "spouse" status to include partners in
homosexual marriages, the court held that a rational basis existed
for Congress' decision to confer "spouse" status only to individuals
in heterosexual marriages, and that this did not violate the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses.25
18. Id. at 1040.
19. Id.
20. Adams II, 673 F.2d at 1040.
21. Id
22. Id. at 1040-41.
23. The Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause is not binding on the federal
government; however, through "reverse incorporation," the federal government is also
bound by the Equal Protection Clause. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
24. Adams II, 673 F.2d at 1041.
25. Id. at 1042-43.
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B. Different Circumstances Justify a Change
in Immigration Law
Much has changed since Adams was decided eleven years ago.
In 1982, no state in the United States, and no country in the world,
recognized same-sex marriages. In 1989, however, Denmark
became the first country to legalize same-sex marriages;26 Norway
followed in 1993.27 These countries treat homosexual and hetero-
sexual marriages identically, except that homosexuals are not
permitted to adopt children.'
Homosexual rights are also expanding in the United States.
Although no state recognizes homosexuals' right to marry, the
Hawaii Supreme Court has recently held that homosexuals are a
suspect class entitled to strict scrutiny protection under the Equal
Rights Amendment of that state's constitution, and that the state
must have a compelling interest to justify its refusal to allow
homosexuals to marry.
29
In addition, many municipalities throughout the United States
have enacted or attempted to enact legislation providing domestic
partnership benefits to homosexuals who register their partners
with the municipality.3 Registered partners receive many of the
private benefits that heterosexual spouses receive from mar-
riage.31
Congress has also changed some of its views regarding
homosexual rights. For example, homosexuals have been removed
from the list of classes excluded from immigration.32
Thus, there is a growing trend toward the recognition of rights
traditionally denied to homosexuals. Changes in the law since
Adams was decided suggest that a spouse in a homosexual
marriage could now meet both requirements set out by the Adams
court for recognition of a marriage for immigration purposes.
26. Julian Isherwood, Denmark Legalizes Homosexual Marriages, UPI, May 26, 1989,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
27. Fiona Smith, Norway Legalizes Gay Marriages, IRISH TIMES, Aug. 4, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
28. See infra notes 51 and 61.
29. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
30. See infra notes 119-36 and accompanying text.
31. Id.
32. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (Supp. IV 1992).
1994] 767
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp.L.J.
Consequently, it is time to reconsider the result achieved by the
Adams court eleven years ago.
II. A HOMOSEXUAL MARRIAGE MAY BE VALID UNDER
STATE LAW FOR A SPOUSE TO QUALIFY FOR LEGAL
PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS
Under the first part of the test established in Adams v.
Howerton, the same-sex marriage must be valid under state law to
be recognized for immigration purposes.33 "[M]arriage is a social
relation subject to the State's police power";' thus, courts defer
almost completely to the state's judgment in determining the
validity of marriages. Because no state in the United States, nor
any country in the world, recognized a homosexual's right to marry
when Adams was decided, it was impossible to meet the Adams
test. Currently, however, homosexuals may marry legally in two
European countries and can enjoy expanded rights in other
countries. In addition, recent U.S. court decisions suggest that
same-sex marriages should be recognized.
A. The Expansion of Homosexual Rights in Europe and
Canada
Most European countries do not recognize same-sex mar-
riages.35 Since Adams was decided in 1982, however, many
countries have expanded homosexual rights generally, and have
also debated recognizing homosexual marriages. For example,
Russia has decriminalized consensual sex between males, and gay
rights activists there are pursuing "homosexual partnership" or
marriage rights.36 In France, where the number of marriages fell
by one-third from 1975 to 1987, and the number of unmarried
33. Adams II, 673 F.2d at 1038.
34. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (restricting freedom to marry based on
racial classifications violates the equal protection clause).
35. German law does not allow homosexuals to marry legally. Nevertheless, German
homosexuals have gone to registry offices and attempted to marry. Alexander Ferguson,
German Gays Turned Down at the Registry Office, Reuter Libr. Rep., Aug. 19, 1992,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
British homosexuals have also tried this tactic. Like German homosexuals, they have
been refused. Bill Frost, Male 'Nuns' Campaign for Right to Gay Marriage, THE TIMES
(London), Mar. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
36. Press Conference on Gay and Lesbian Rights (Russian-American Information
Center, Khlebny Pereulok), Federal Information Systems Corp., Official Kremlin Int'l News
Broadcast, June 2, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
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couples living together quadrupled from one-half million in 1975
to two million in 1992, activists have proposed a "contract of civil
union" to grant unmarried heterosexual and homosexual couples
the same rights that married couples receive regarding death
duties, pensions, and child custody.'
In Canada, homosexuals are challenging the law forbidding
them to marry by claiming a violation of their equality rights under
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.38  The Canadian Govern-
ment has proposed legislation to add sexual orientation to a list of
characteristics, including race and religion, against which it is illegal
to discriminate in employment and public service.3 9 Unfortunate-
ly, the same legislation would define marital status as a heterosexu-
al relationship.'
It is likely that Canada will grant additional rights to same-sex
couples in the future. Ontario's Attorney-General has promised
legislation that will give same-sex couples rights and benefits, and
she has promised to eliminate the word "spouse" from Ontario's
laws.4 Furthermore, an Ontario Human Rights Commission
board of inquiry "recently declared that same sex couples must be
included in all employee benefit plans."'42
In the Netherlands, although the Dutch Supreme Court has,
thus far, refused to recognize a marriage right for homosexuals, it
has acknowledged that refusing to allow homosexuals to marry
might "put them at a legal disadvantage on such issues as inheri-
tance, pension rights, and tax liability."'43 In response, the Dutch
Government announced that it would "investigate the possibility
of allowing people to enter a 'registered partnership' that would
give them the same rights to one another's pensions and inheri-
tances as married couples."" In addition, an opinion poll has
37. Will You Join Me in Civil Unionlock, ECONOMIST, May 2, 1992, at 59.
38. Stephen Bindman, Gay Couple Start Fight To Be Legally Married, CALGARY
HERALD, May 19, 1992, at A6.
39. Anthony Boadle, Canada To Legislate Against Homosexual Discrimination,
Reuters, Dec. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
40. Id.
41. Claire Bernstein, Why Society Finds It Difficult To Accept Same-Sex Couples,
TORONTO STAR, Aug. 5, 1993, at All.
42. Id.
43. Dutch Supreme Court Rules Against Homosexual Marriage, Reuter Libr. Rep.,
Oct. 19, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
44. Netherlands Considers Giving Legal Rights to Homosexual Couples, Reuter Libr.
Rep., Nov. 1, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
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shown that 52.6% of Dutch citizens would allow homosexual
marriages."
Thus, although homosexuals have not been granted the right
to marry in the above mentioned countries, substantial movements
for the recognition of gay rights exist, and laws forbidding same-
sex marriages are currently being challenged.
1. Sweden
Several European countries now permit same-sex couples to
marry, or grant homosexual couples rights identical to those that
married couples receive. Sweden, for example, passed legislation
in 1987 that gives homosexuals the right to sign housing leases as
couples, provides inheritance rights in the absence of a will, and
regulates the distribution of property upon the termination of live-
in relationships.' The Swedish law applies to both heterosexual
and homosexual live-in sexual relationships. 7 More recently,
Sweden's Social Welfare Board proposed a "registered partner-
ship" that would provide co-habitating homosexuals with almost all
rights created by legal marriage, except the right to adopt
children.' Yet, the rights recognized in Sweden do not confer
the status of marriage on homosexuals. Thus, the relationship
between a U.S. citizen and a Swedish citizen would not create
"spouse" status under the INA.
2. Denmark
Denmark, which first legalized adult homosexual acts in
1930,' 9 has gone the furthest of any country in extending rights
to homosexuals. In 1986, Denmark granted homosexuals the same
rights of inheritance granted to married couples.5 0 In 1989,
45. Id.
46. Sweden Approves Gay Rights Measure, L.A. TIMES, June 5, 1987, at A15.
47. Eva Ahlberg, Live-In Lovers in Sweden, Including Gays, Given Same Rights As
Married Couples, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1988, at A15.
48. Marriage Rights Proposed for Swedish Homosexuals, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB.,
June 19, 1990, at A6. The legislation was intended to encourage monogamy and limit
AIDS. Id. The U.S. Congress has stated its intent to encourage this public policy as well.
Id.
49. Michael Duggan, Danish Parliament Debates Bill to Legalize Homosexual
Marriages, Reuter Libr. Rep., Mar. 16, 1988, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws
File.
50. Homosexuals Win Inheritance Rights in Denmark, Reuters N. Eur. Service, May
30, 1986, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
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Denmark became the first country in the world to legalize same-
sex marriage, providing homosexual couples almost the same rights
as heterosexual couples and subjecting them to the same obliga-
tions."1 Homosexuals in "registered partnerships" automatically
inherit from each other, must support each other, are taxed as
married couples, have the same access to social services as married
couples, and must officially divorce to dissolve their relation-
ships.52
To qualify for registration, the applicants must be of the same
sex and must share the same address.53 Bigamy is not permit-
ted.' Registered partnerships with foreigners are permitted as
well,55 and homosexuals in registered partnerships have the same
rights in immigration as married heterosexuals.56 Although
reducing the risk of AIDS was not the intent of the legislation, it
was the expected result of the encouragement of "more stable
relationships."57 In the first three months after registered part-
nerships were legalized, 648 Danish homosexuals married. By
May 1992, 491 lesbian and 1400 gay couples had married.59
3. Norway
In 1993, Norway became the second country to permit
homosexual marriages.' As in Danish same-sex marriages,
Norwegian homosexuals may enter into registered partnerships
that obligate the partners to support each other, allow inheritance
rights and taxation privileges identical to those granted heterosexu-
51. Isherwood, supra note 26. The law went into effect on October 1, 1989. Sheila
Rule, Rights for Gay Couples in Denmark, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1989, at A8.
Homosexuals in registered partnerships may not adopt children and their unions are
not recognized by the state Lutheran Church. Isherwood, supra note 26. The prohibition
on adoptions may be attributed to the government's fear that Third World countries would
no longer make children available to Danish families for adoption, and not to any belief





56. Tim Pearce, Denmark Legalizes Gay Marriages, Reuters, May 26, 1989, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Papers Allnws. At least one of the partners must be a resident
Danish citizen. Rule, supra note 51.
57. Isherwood, supra note 26.
58. More Than 600 Danish Homosexuals Marry Under New Law, Reuters, Apr. 18,
1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.
59. Alex Duval Smith, Blissfully Wedded to an Ideal, GUARDIAN, May 8, 1992, at 72.
60. Smith, supra note 27.
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al married couples, and permit legal dissolution of the relationships
in the same manner by which heterosexuals dissolve their mar-
riages.
6 1
B. Effects of European Laws on the United States
The trend towards recognition of homosexual rights in other
countries has implications for the United States. First, it demon-
strates a global trend towards the recognition of equal rights for
homosexuals. Second, it increases the likelihood that homosexual
marriage will remain an issue in the United States, because
American citizens may legally and validly marry Danish or Norwe-
gian citizens of the same sex under those countries' laws. The
following Section of this paper examines the nature of the right to
marriage in the United States and the steps that states have taken
towards recognizing permanent homosexual relationships.
III. THE INSTITUTION OF MARRIAGE
A. Marriage Is a Fundamental Right
In Loving v. Virginia,62 the Supreme Court recognized that
"marriage is a social relation subject to the State's police pow-
er. '63  Nevertheless, the Court also recognized marriage as a
fundamental right entitled to special protection, stating that
"[m]arriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to
our very existence and survival,"' and that "[t]he freedom to
marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."' In
Zablocki v. Redhail,66 the Court stated that "recent decisions have
established that the right to marry is part of the fundamental 'right
61. Id. As with registered partnerships in Denmark, homosexuals may not adopt
children and are not entitled to church marriages. Id
62. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (Virginia's adoption of miscegenation statutes violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses).
63. Id. at 7.
64. Id at 12.
65. Id
66. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
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of privacy' implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause." 67
These cases involved a heterosexual's right to marry; Ameri-
can courts have not been as willing to protect a homosexual's right
to marry. For example, in Singer v. Hara,' where the male
plaintiffs sued to compel the County Auditor to issue them a
marriage license, Washington's Supreme Court held that the state's
statutory prohibition against same-sex marriage did not violate the
state's Equal Rights Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.69
In Singer, the court first interpreted its statute to exclude
same-sex couples from marriage. Although the language of the
statute provided the requirements for "persons" to marry within
the state, the statutory language replaced prior language which had
explicitly referred to males and females.7' The court then
rejected the claim that excluding same-sex couples from marriage
violated the state's Equal Rights Amendment because the term
"marriage" itself connotes the "union of one man and one
woman";71 thus, a same-sex relationship was not included within
the definition of marriage, and the right was, therefore, denied.
The court also determined that the statute did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because
the statute was presumed constitutional, the court determined that
the traditional definition of marriage as a relationship between a
man and a woman was a rational basis for the statute.72
67. Id. at 384. In Zablocki, the plaintiff claimed that a state statute requiring a
resident to obtain court approval to marry if he had a minor child who was not in his
custody and whom he was obligated to support violated the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause. The state claimed that its goal was to "establish a mechanism
whereby persons with support obligations to children from prior marriages could be
counseled before they entered into new marital relationships and incurred further support
obligations." Id. at 388. Although "[c]ourt permission to marry was to be required," the
state was supposed to grant permission automatically after counseling. Id. As no
counseling was required or provided under the statute, the automatic grant of permission
was, in reality, non-existent; thus, the state's interests did not justify the means chosen, and
the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause. hI. at 388-89.
68. 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. 1974).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1189.
71. Id. at 1191-92.
72. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1196-97. The court declined to apply a strict scrutiny standard
of review because it found that the statute did not discriminate against homosexuals ld.
at 1196. In addition, a definition of marriage that excluded homosexuals did not create
a suspect classification. Id.
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The state's compelling interest in regulating marriage is clear:
a state can function only if it has citizens to govern, and children
are (traditionally) the product of marriage, so marriage is neces-
sary to produce more citizens for the state. This proposition is
supported by Singer, which noted that the right to marry is granted
because
society as a whole views marriage as the appropriate and
desirable forum for procreation and the rearing of children.
This is true even though married couples are not required to
become parents and even though some couples are incapable of
becoming parents and even though not all couples who produce
children are married. These are, however, exceptional situa-
tions. The fact remains that marriage exists as a protected legal
institution primarily because of societal values associated with
the propagation of the human race. Further, it is apparent that
no same-sex couple offers the possibility of the birth of children
by their union.73
Viewing marriage as the only appropriate forum for procrea-
tion and child rearing is both idealistic and unrealistic. Nearly
one-fourth of all American households consist of children raised
by a single parent, and almost one-fourth of new births are to
unmarried women.74 Numerous children are born to homosexual
parents as well. There are nearly three million gay and lesbian
parents in the United States, raising eight to ten million children
in their households.75 Thus, a large minority of parents are
raising children-many by their own choice-outside the tradition-
al institution of marriage.
In addition, by denying homosexual parents the right to
marry, the state creates problems for itself and for those parents'
children. Although each homosexual partner may consider him or
herself a "parent" of the child, only the biological parent has a
legal obligation to support the child. Thus, it is more likely that
the child will have to depend on public financial support through
welfare, creating an obligation for the government and fewer
means of support for the child.
73. Id. at 1195.
74. NAN D. HUNTER ET AL., THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN: THE BASIC
ACLU GUIDE TO A GAY PERSON'S RIGHTS 74 (3d ed. 1992).




B. Homosexuals Are Entitled to the Same Right to Privacy as
Heterosexuals
Courts might attempt to justify their denial of homosexuals'
fundamental right to marry by claiming that the Supreme Court
has found that homosexuals are not entitled to the right to privacy
that protects heterosexuals. After all, if homosexuals do not have
a right to engage in sexual conduct in the privacy of their own
bedrooms, they have no reason to marry.
In Griswold v. Connecticut,76 where the plaintiffs, who were
employees of Planned Parenthood, were convicted of disseminating
information about contraception and of prescribing contraception,
the Court first recognized that married persons have a right to
privacy in the intimate details of their relationship in the bedroom,
emanating from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amend-
ments.' In Eisenstadt v. Baird,78 where the plaintiff was convict-
ed of the felony of dispensing contraception, the Court extended
this right to single individuals, finding that
the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and
heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with
a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.79
In Bowers v. Hardwick,' the Court declined to extend the
fundamental right of privacy to homosexuals. Rather, the majority
characterized the plaintiff's claim more narrowly as that of a
fundamental right to engage in sodomy." The Court rationalized
that sodomy had been a crime in many states since the signing of
the Constitution, and was still a criminal act in nearly half the
states; thus, there was no fundamental right to engage in such
conduct.82
76. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
77. Id. at 484.
78. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
79. Id. at 453.
80. 478 U.S. 186, reh'g denied 478 U.S. 1039 (1986).
81. Id. at 190.
82. Id. at 192-94.
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Justice Blackmun addressed this issue in his dissent. Attack-
ing the majority's rationale, he compared the Court's treatment of
the Georgia statute in Bowers to its treatment of the Virginia
statute in Loving. In Loving, the Court also faced conduct
outlawed by many states, but the Court ignored the tradition of
illegality to find that the statute violated not only the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause but also the Due Process
Clause, because it denied the Lovings the "freedom of choice to
marry."'" In Bowers, the Court could just as easily have held that
the prohibition against sodomy intruded on the right to privacy in
the bedroom, and could have found the statute unconstitutional on
that basis.
Justice Blackmun would have continued the logical trend that
began with Griswold and continued with Eisenstadt by recognizing
the fundamental right at stake not as one to engage in sodomy, but
as "the right to be let alone."8' He would have protected the
plaintiff's interest in Bowers by looking to "the basic reasons why
certain rights associated with the family have been accorded
shelter under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause."'  Justice Blackmun found that certain rights are
protected because they are central to an individual's life, and
because "a person belongs to himself and not others nor to society
as a whole."'
Justice Blackmun enumerated several protected interests: the
right to marry, "because marriage is an association that promotes
a way of life,... a harmony in living . . . a bilateral loyalty"; the
decision whether or not to have a child, "because parenthood
alters so dramatically an individual's self-definition"; and the
family, "because it contributes so powerfully to the happiness of
individuals."'  When courts protect these interests, they protect
"intimate human associations,"' the same interest at stake in
Bowers.
83. Id. at 210 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). This is also comparable to the decision in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 179, reh'g denied 410 U.S. 959 (1973), where the Court recognized
a fundamental right to abortion, even though abortion was also illegal at that time.
84. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 204.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 205.
88. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1423 (2d ed. 1988).
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Justice Blackmun focused on the importance of sexual
intimacy. He noted that it is "a sensitive, key relationship of
human existence, central to family life, community welfare, and the
development of human personality," and that
the fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way
through their intimate sexual relationships with others suggests
... that there may be many "right" ways of conducting those
relationships, and that much of the richness of the relationship
will come from the freedom an individual has to choose the
form and nature of these intensely personal bonds.8 9
Justice Blackmun also recognized that "a necessary corollary of
giving individuals freedom to choose how to conduct their lives is
acceptance of the fact that different individuals will make different
choices. '
In examining the majority's decision, Justice Blackmun found
that the majority failed to recognize all individuals' fundamental
interest "in controlling the nature of their intimate associations
with others," a conclusion that logically follows the Court's
holdings in Griswold and Eisenstadt. This interest was implicated
particularly in Bowers, because the plaintiff's objectionable
behavior occurred in his home, a place protected specifically by the
Fourth Amendment.9'
Justice Blackmun would also have found that the plaintiff's
interest fell within "a certain private sphere of individual liberty"
with which the government may not interfere.' He noted that
the Court protects privacy in two contexts: privacy related to
decisions that are "properly for the individual to make," and
privacy related to "certain places without regard for the particular
activities in which the individuals who occupy them are en-
gaged."'93 "Indeed," Justice Blackmun wrote, "the right of an
individual to conduct intimate relationships in the intimacy of his
or her own home seems to me to be the heart of the Constitution's
protection of privacy."' In fact, "the relevant question is not
89. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 205.
90. Id. at 205-06.
91. Id. at 206-07.
92. Id at 203.
93. Id. at 204.
94. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 208.
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what Michael Hardwick was doing in the privacy of his own
bedroom, but what the State of Georgia was doing there."95
Justice Blackmun's opinion reflects the idea that the "individ-
ual's 'right of decision'. about procreation,"' and not procreation
itself, is what is protected by the constitutional principle of
individual autonomy in Griswold and Eisenstadt.
In each case, the Court protected the decision to engage in sex
without bearing or begetting a child. These holdings thus
mandated heightened scrutiny not of state restrictions on
procreative sex, but of restrictions on recreational or
expressional sex-sex solely as a facet of associational intima-
cy-whether between spouses or between unmarried lovers.'
Thus, the issue properly at stake in Bowers was not whether
sodomy is constitutionally protected, "but whether private,
consensual, adult sexual acts partake of traditionally revered
liberties of intimate association and individual autonomy.'"8 The
Court has previously recognized these as protected interests and,
had it characterized Hardwick's claim as such, it probably would
have protected Hardwick's interest as well. Accordingly, if the
Court in Bowers had characterized the issue as whether
Hardwick's right to engage in sexual conduct irrespective of the
decision whether to bear or beget a child was violated, courts
would have significantly less justification today for denying same-
sex couples the right to marry.
C. A Marriage That Is Valid Where It Is Celebrated
Is Valid Everywhere
It is a well-established principle that if a marriage is valid in
the place where it is celebrated, the marriage will be valid in any
state unless it is contrary to strong public policy," for example,
if it is incestuous" or if it is between persons of the same
95. TRIBE, supra note 88, at 1428.
96. Id. at 1423 (emphasis in original).
97. Id. (emphasis in original).
98. Id. at 1428.
99. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971) (stating
that "a marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage was
contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public policy
of another state which had the most significant relationship to the spouses and the
marriage at the time of the marriage").
100. Fisher v. Fisher, 165 N.E. 460 (N.Y. 1929) (recognizing a marriage performed
under the laws of Washington, D.C. as valid in the State of New York).
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sex.101 A number of recent court decisions, however, have held
as valid marriages those that are incestuous, or between under-age
or genetically same-sex parties.1°2 Because states are becoming
more lenient in their recognition of marriages that were formerly
strictly against public policy, states should also be willing to
recognize same-sex marriages that are valid in other countries, or
may eventually be valid in a number of states.
1. Incestuous Marriages Have Been Held Valid
Traditionally, a marriage between parties who are related to
each other by a certain degree of kinship is void as incestuous.
For example, in Singh v. Singh,10 3 the Connecticut Supreme
Court ruled that, under Connecticut's state statute, "a marriage
between persons related to one another as half-uncle and half-
niece is void"'1  when the marriage was celebrated in Connecti-
cut.
Not all states adopt this position, however. For example, New
Mexico's Court of Appeals held in dictum that an incestuous
marriage that is valid in the jurisdiction where it was celebrated
would be contrary to public policy, but would not offend "a
sufficiently strong public policy to outweigh the purposes served by
the rule of comity."' 5  Similarly, in In re Estate of
Loughmiller,'06 the Supreme Court of Kansas recognized a
Colorado marriage between first cousins, finding that "a first
cousin marriage validly contracted elsewhere is [not] odious to the
public policy of" Kansas. 17 The court noted three reasons for
forbidding incestuous marriage: (1) its prohibition under ecclesias-
tical law; (2) the fear of the weakening of the population due to
inbreeding; and (3) "the sociological consequences of competition
101. Incestuous marriages and marriages between underage parties or between same-
sex parties have traditionally been void ab initio; they are annulled and, in effect, never
existed. HOMER H. CLARK, 1 THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 142-73 (2d ed. 1987). Marriages with less significant defects-for example, those
where one partner is impotent or where the marriage was induced by fraud-are not void,
but voidable at the offended partner's option. Id. at 176, 191.
102. See infra notes 103-17 and accompanying text.
103. 569 A.2d 1112 (Conn. 1990).
104. Id. at 1121.
105. Leszinske v. Poole, 798 P.2d 1049, 1055, cert. denied, 110 N.M. 533 (1990).
106. 629 P.2d 156 (Kan. 1981).
107. Id. at 161.
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for sexual companionship among family members."1' Neverthe-
less, the court found that these reasons are less compelling today
than they were when the statute forbidding such marriages was
enacted; thus, it held that the marriage between the first cousins
was valid."l
Homosexual marriages have also been considered to be
against public policy for two reasons. First, traditional prohibitions
against sodomy are implicated in homosexual marriages. Second,
same-sex marriages, unlike heterosexual marriages, do not give rise
to a relationship capable of procreation. Just as the policy reasons
against incestuous marriages are less compelling today, so are
those reasons against same-sex marriages; many states have
repealed the prohibitions on sodomy, and scientific and legal
advances have made it possible for same-sex couples to have and
raise children. If a state can recognize a valid marriage celebrated
in another state between parties so related as to make the
marriage incestuous, it should also recognize a valid same-sex
marriage celebrated in another country between people of the
same sex.
2. Marriages Between Under-Age Parties Have Been Held
Valid
Marriages between parties below the age of consent have
traditionally been held void unless the parents or the court gave
their consent. Nevertheless, the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland has held that the marriage of a sixteen-and-one-half-
year-old male to an eighteen-year-old female was valid, even
though the parties lied to obtain the marriage license and did not
have parental consent." Other courts have reached similar
results."'
Marriages to which an under-age person is a party usually
require either parental or judicial consent to be valid, because the
108. Id. at 158.
109. Id. at 161.
110. Picarella v. Picarella, 316 A.2d 826 (Md. 1974).
111. See, e.g., Browning v. Browning, 130 P. 852 (Kan. 1913) (refusing to annul a
marriage entered into by a minor in violation of a statute requiring consent); State v.
Ward, 28 S.E.2d 785 (S.C. 1944) (upholding the marriage of underage parties); Ex parte
Hollopeter, 100 P. 159 (Wash. 1909) (holding valid the marriage of an underage girl who




state has a legitimate, if not compelling interest in protecting
minors. In contrast, parties to same-sex marriages, if they have
reached the age of consent, are responsible for their decision-
making and do not require governmental supervision. The
government, therefore, has a much weaker interest, if any at all, in
protecting such parties. Thus, courts should be more willing to
recognize same-sex marriages that are valid where they are
celebrated.
3. Marriages Between Parties Who Are Genetically the Same
Sex have Been Held Valid
At least one court has recognized a marriage between parties
who were genetically the same sex. In M. T v. J. T,2 New
Jersey's Superior Court held that a man who had a sex-change
operation so that he was physically female, and who thought of
himself as female, had the "capacity to enter into a valid marriage
relationship with a person of the opposite sex.
113
Because M. T v. J T was decided by a state court, only New
Jersey is bound by the court's holding." 4 Nevertheless, the
decision is of great importance to same-sex partners seeking legal
sanction for their relationships because it counters the reasoning
of the Washington court in Singer v. Hara."5 An important basis
for the decision in Singer was the idea that states permit marriage
because it is the best atmosphere for procreation and raising
children, regardless of whether or not an opposite-sex couple
intends or is able to have children.
1 16
The New Jersey court's decision in M. T v. J. T suggests that
the potential for children resulting from a marriage and being
raised in the traditional atmosphere of one male and one female
parent is not dispositive of the marriage's validity. Children
cannot result naturally from the union of two people-like the
112. 355 A.2d 204, cert denied, 364 A.2d 1076 (N.J. 1976).
113. Id. at 211.
114. See In re Declaratory Relief for Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio 1987). The Ohio
probate court explicitly rejected the "liberal posture" adopted in New Jersey and held that
Ohio law provided no authority "for the issuance of a marriage license... [for] a marriage
between a post-operative male to female transsexual person and a male person." Id. at
832.
115. 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. 1974). See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
116. See discussion supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing Singer, 522 P.2d
at 1195).
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couple in M.-T v. J.T-who are genetically of the same sex.
Although the New Jersey court based its decision, in part, on the
transsexual's psychological belief that he was female,"7 no
operation can change the fact that he was a genetic male who
could only maintain external female physical characteristics
through surgery and the ingestion of female hormones. In fact, the
marriage in M. T v. J. T was a marriage of a same-sex couple, and
any children that the couple might raise would be raised by two
men, although one would present himself as a female.
E. Some Municipalities and Courts Grant Homosexuals Rights
in Recognition of Permanent, Committed
Homosexual Relationships
Some municipalities and state courts recognize that the
traditional definition of family as persons related by blood,
marriage, or adoption" 8 is no longer sufficient. Thus, these
municipalities and courts grant homosexuals rights that are usually
reserved for heterosexuals.
1. Domestic Partnerships
Domestic partnerships permit unmarried individu-
als-heterosexual and homosexual-to register their partners so
that the partners receive the same benefits that a spouse would
receive by valid marriage." 9 Domestic partnerships may be
offered by individual businesses or by municipalities, which may
provide partners with any benefits they choose. Usually, these
benefits include health insurance benefits in the case of businesses,
and such rights as disability, illness, or bereavement leave, or
hospital visitation in the case of municipalities.120 The only
limitation is that the benefits must be those that the business or
municipality is authorized to provide itself.'2 This means that
117. M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d at 211.
118. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498 (1976).
119. Robert L. Eblin, Note, Domestic Partnership Recognition in the Workplace:
Equitable Employee Benefits for Gay Couples (and Others), 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1067, 1069
(1990).
120. Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, Note, A More Perfect Union: A Legal and
Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1164, 1194-95
(1992).
121. Id. at 1164.
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registering a domestic partnership will not make the partners
eligible for federal benefits, such as social security or tax deduc-
tions, or any other benefits that the individual business or
municipality cannot provide. 22 All that is required to register a
partnership is for the parties to meet the requirements established
by the business or municipality, such as the length of time the
parties have been together, and the registration of the partner-
ship."2
Several municipalities in the United States have enacted
legislation recognizing domestic partnerships. For example, San
Francisco enacted domestic partnership legislation by popular vote
in May, 1989.124 The ordinance applies to heterosexuals and
homosexuals "who share a residence and living expenses" and
have "an intimate ... relationship of mutual caring," and requires
a $35 registration fee." The domestic partners must be unmar-
ried at the time of registration, and they must submit formal
notification at the end of the relationship.'26 In addition, part-
ners may not register a new relationship until six months after the
termination of a previously registered relationship.1 27  Rights
granted to registered partners by this legislation include hospital
visits."n This right is significant for homosexuals with a partner
who has AIDS.
San Francisco was the first U.S. city to enact such legislation,
but three other cities in California-Santa Cruz, Berkeley, and
West Hollywood-previously required employers to extend spousal
benefits (e.g., health care) to unmarried partners.'2 9 West Holly-
wood extends spousal benefits to the partners of city employees,
gives partners hospital and jail visitation rights, and forbids
landlords from evicting a tenant whose "domestic partner moves
122. Id. at 1203.
123. Id. at 1192-94.
124. Denmark To Legalize Homosexual Marriages, CHI. TRIB., May 26,1989, at 4; Dean
Lokken, San Francisco Homosexuals Line Up To Declare Undying Love, Reuters, Feb. 14,
1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allnws File.




129. Id. Most people who benefitted from these laws, in effect, were unmarried
heterosexual couples. Id.
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in" with him or her.13° Laguna Beach, California, also has a
domestic partnership law that gives domestic partners rights that
are crucial to those enduring their partners' illness: power of
attorney in healthcare matters and in disposing of personal effects
upon death.'3'
California is not the only state where domestic partnership
legislation has been enacted. Seattle's Commission for Lesbians
and Gays drafted a proposal for domestic partnership legislation
that would permit homosexuals to register their relationships.'32
New York City has also passed domestic partnership legisla-
tion.' In New York, registration of a relationship with the
city's personnel department requires that a couple first live
together for one year and that they "attest that they have a 'close
and committed personal relationship involving shared responsibili-
ties.""'  Registered partners are entitled to bereavement
leave.'35 In New York, even without the formality of a regis-
tered partnership, partners in long-term homosexual relationships
have the same rights as surviving spouses to take over rent-
stabilized apartments when their partners die.136
IV. A STATE-APPROVED HOMOSEXUAL MARRIAGE MAY
QUALIFY UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY Acr
Under the second prong of the Adams test for determining
whether a marriage will be recognized for immigration purposes,
the state-approved marriage must qualify under the INA.
137
Because Congress has plenary power with regard to immigration
130. Kathleen Kelleher, Gay Couple Challenge State Laws on Marriage, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 21, 1993, at B3.
131. Id.
132. Elizabeth Rhodes, New Ties That Bind-Same-Sex Couples Challenge the System
To Gain Legal Recognition of Their Commitments to Each Other, SEAIrLE TIMES, July
21, 1991, at K1.
133. Walter Isaacson, Should Gays Have Marriage Rights? On Two Coasts, the Growing
Debate Produces Two Different Answers, TIME, Nov. 20, 1989, at 101.
134. ld.
135. Id.
136. Braschi v. Stahl, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989). In Brashci, the Court of Appeals of
New York held that "family," for the purposes of inheritance of rent-stabilized apartments,
includes "two adult lifetime partners whose relationship is long term and characterized by
an emotional and financial commitment and interdependence." Id. at 788-89. Thus, if
Braschi could prove that he and his partner had such a relationship, he could inherit the
rent-stabilized apartment that his now-deceased partner had leased for years. Id.
137. Adams II, 673 F.2d at 1038.
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matters, "the intent of Congress governs the conferral of spouse
status under section 201(b) [of the INA], and a valid marriage is
determinative only if Congress so intends." 3 ' Yet, Congressional
intent on the issue of whether a same-sex marriage that is valid
under state law confers spouse status under the amended INA is
unclear. The following sections will analyze Congress' intent in
light of current circumstances. Congress' plenary power in
immigration will be discussed, as will the qualifications for spouse
status under the INA. Then, the amendment of the INA and the
effect it has on the Adams decision will be evaluated.
A. Congress' Plenary Power in Immigration
"The power to exclude aliens is 'inherent in sovereignty,
necessary for maintaining normal international relations and
defending the country against foreign encroachments and dan-
gers-a power to be exercised exclusively by the political branches
of government."'139 Thus, "the Court without exception has sus-
tained Congress' 'plenary power to make rules for the admission
of aliens and to exclude those who possess those characteristics
which Congress has forbidden." ' 4  Because Congress has
plenary power in immigration, "the decisions of Congress are
subject only to limited judicial review."' 41 Therefore, courts must
examine Congressional intent to interpret legislation pertaining to
immigration.
B. Who Qualifies As a Spouse Under the INA?
Under current U.S. law, the number of immigrants who are
granted entry into the United States is limited in several ways.
Certain qualifications, including the status of being the spouse of
a U.S. citizen, facilitate foreigners' entry.'42 Yet, the law does
not clearly define which persons qualify for "spouse" status.
43
138. Id. at 1039.
139. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972).
140. Id. at 775, citing Boutilier v. United States I.N.S., 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967).
141. Adams II, 673 F.2d at 1041.
142. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 1992).
143. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(35) (1988). Section 1101(a)(35) states that the term "spouse"
does not include "a spouse, wife, or husband by reason of any marriage ceremony where
the contracting parties thereto are not physically present in the presence of each other,
unless the marriage shall have been consummated." This does not provide guidance for
the situation where two people of the same-sex have married in each others' presence.
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Thus, the courts must determine who qualifies as a spouse for
immigration purposes.
1. The INA Before the 1990 Amendment
In Adams, the court examined the INA to determine whether
Congress intended to qualify homosexual spouses as spouses under
the Act.'" At the time the court decided Adams, the INA re-
quired exclusion of "aliens afflicted with psychopathic personality,
or sexual deviation, or a mental defect."'4 5  This Section has
traditionally been interpreted to exclude homosexuals; before the
term "sexual deviation" was added to the Act, the term "psycho-
pathic personality" was interpreted to include "homosexuals and
sex perverts."146
The Ninth Circuit did not question the constitutionality of
categorically excluding homosexuals in Adams. Shortly after
Adams was decided, however, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California ruled that the policy of excluding
homosexuals was unconstitutional. 147 The court rationalized that
there was no "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" for the
categorical exclusion, for medical authorities no longer recognized
"homosexuality per se as a sexual deviation, a mental disorder, or
a mental or medical illness of any type."'"
2. Amendment of the INA
Congress subsequently amended the INA so that homosexuals
are no longer excluded from immigration. In his statement
proposing the Amendment, Senator Alan Cranston suggested that
he agreed with the California district court's finding that the policy
of excluding homosexuals was unconstitutional.4 9 He focused on
the discriminatory nature of the exclusionary provision, asserting
that the provision "attempts to use private sexual orientation as a
144. Adams II, 673 F.2d at 1040.
145. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1964 & Supp. II 1967).
146. Quiroz v. Neelly, 291 F.2d 906, 907 (1961). See also S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess., at 9, H.R. REP. No. 1365, 2d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653,
cited in Boutilier v. U.S.I.N.S., 387 U.S. 118, 121-22 (1967).
147. Lesbian/Gay Freedom Day Comm., Inc. v. U.S.I.N.S., 541 F. Supp 569,586 (1982),
affd, Hill v. United States I.N.S., 719 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1983).
148. Id.
149. Amending Section 212(a)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 131 CONG.
REc. S196 (1985) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
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criterion for judging who does and who does not qualify for
admission to the United States," and that the "[a]doption of [the
amendment] will end a form of discrimination which has no valid
scientific or medical basis and which violates traditional American
respect for the privacy and dignity of an individual.' 50 Further,
Senator Cranston expressly stated that the amendment "is
intended to make clear that sexual orientation alone cannot be the
ground for denying entry to aliens wishing to visit or seeking to
immigrate to the United States."'5
The Amendment removed sexual preference as a ground for
excluding persons attempting to immigrate to the United States,
largely because the scientific grounds for classifying homosexuals
as "psychopathic personalities" have been discredited and are no
longer accepted in the scientific/medical community. The legisla-
tive history of the Amendment explains the reasons for repealing
the provision excluding homosexuals:
Not only is this provision out of step with current notions of
privacy and personal dignity, it is also inconsistent with contem-
porary psychiatric theories. When this provision was adopted,
homosexuality was viewed as a form of mental illness. However,
in 1973, the American Psychiatric Association determined that
homosexuality is not a mental disorder. Subsequently, in 1979,
the Surgeon General determined that the [Public Health
Service] could no longer issue medical certificates that an alien
was homosexual, since homosexuality is not a medical condition.
4.. To put an end to this unfairness Congress must repeal the
"sexual deviation" ground. Therefore, in order to make it clear
that the United States does not view personal decisions about
sexual orientation as a danger to other people in our society,
the bill repeals the "sexual deviation" exclusion ground.152
This declaration states that Congress no longer intends to
exclude homosexual immigrants from the United States and,
further, finds that individuals' decisions about sexuality cause no
risk to others. Consequently, much of the court's rationale in
Adams no longer has a legal basis.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. H.R. REP. No. 723(I), 101st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6736.
1994] 787
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp.L.J.
3. The Adams Court's Rationale is Undermined
In Adams, the court concluded that it was "unlikely that
Congress intended to give homosexual spouses preferential
admission treatment ... when, in the very same amendments
adding that section, it mandated their exclusion. Reading these
provisions together, we can only conclude that Congress intended
that only partners in heterosexual marriages be considered spouses
under [the Act]. 153  The repeal of the exclusionary provision
substantially undermines this interpretation of the INA. Conse-
quently, this rationale is no longer valid to justify the non-recogni-
tion of same-sex spouses for immigration purposes.
The court also based its decision on the legislative definition
of the word "spouse.""' 4 The court concluded that Congress did
not intend for same-sex spouses to be "spouses" within the INA
for three reasons: (1) because Congress has defined "spouse" to
require that the parties be present at their marriage ceremony or
that they consummate the marriage;5 ' (2) because "valid mar-
riages entered into by parties not intending to live together as
husband and wife are not recognized for immigration purpos-
es";156 and (3) because the INS "has interpreted the term
'spouse' to exclude a person entering a homosexual marriage.' ' 7
In addition, the court noted that Congress had not stated any-
where that the term "spouse" was meant to include a person of the
same-sex as the other party to the marriage, and that the term
"spouse," therefore, should be given its ordinary, every-day
meaning.
158
None of these reasons justifies the court's refusal to interpret
a same-sex partner as a "spouse" within the meaning of the INA.
The first two reasons reflect the fear that parties will enter into
marriages solely to enable the foreign spouse to gain legal entry
into the United States. The Congressional aim is to prevent sham
marriages, not to prevent same-sex partners of valid marriages
from obtaining the full rights to which they are entitled as a
married couple. Thus, these justifications are not relevant to
153. Adams II, 673 F.2d at 1040-41.
154. Id. at 1039-40.
155. Id. at 1039.
156. Id. at 1040.
157. Id.
158. Adams II, 673 F.2d at 1040.
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determine whether same-sex spouses should be considered
"spouses" under the INA.
The justification based on the INS' interpretation that
"spouse" excludes same-sex partners is also weakened by the
Amendment to the INA. The INS originally interpreted the Act
as excluding homosexuals at a time when Congress intended to
exclude them from the United States. Nevertheless, while the
American Psychiatric Association and the Surgeon General were
in the process of reevaluating the status of homosexuality as a
mental defect, but before they determined that homosexuality was
not such a defect, the INS changed its procedures to allow
homosexuals into the country.159 This suggests that the INS
would also change its definition of the word "spouse," based on
the Congressional Amendment to the INA.
Additionally, if a state determines that a same-sex marriage is
valid, the word "spouse" would include a same-sex partner in its
common, every-day meaning. Thus, the Adams court's justifica-
tions for finding that Congress did not intend for same-sex spouses
to qualify under the INA are substantially weakened by the
Amendment to the Act.
C. What the Court Should Do in the Absence of Clear
Legislative Intent
Although Congress has not explicitly stated that it intended to
recognize same-sex spouses as "spouses" within the meaning of the
INA, it has repealed the law that the court used to justify denying
same-sex spouses this recognition. This repeal was based on the
realization that the factual basis for the law-the belief that homo-
sexuals have psychopathic personalities and that homosexuality is
a sexual deviation-was incorrect.W0 Thus, when faced with a
similar situation, a court must reinterpret Congressional intent to
determine whether a same-sex spouse to a marriage that is recog-
nized as valid by a state would qualify for "spouse" status under
the INA. In light of the repeal of the exclusionary provision, the
court should consider the U.S. citizen's right to the equal protec-
tion of the laws to recognize the same-sex spouse of a valid
marriage as a spouse for immigration purposes.
159. Hill v. United States I.N.S., 775 F.2d 1037, 1039 (1985).
160. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
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1. The Federal Government Is Bound by the Equal Protection
Clause
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
is not binding on the federal government; it requires that the states
do not deny their citizens the equal protection of the laws. 161
Nevertheless, the process of "reverse incorporation" makes the
Equal Protection Clause binding on the federal government
through the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 162 There-
fore, the federal government is subject to the same constraints of
the Equal Protection Clause as a state government; the federal
government may not deprive its citizens of the equal protection of
the laws.
2. A Homosexual Has an Equal Protection Claim If His Same-
Sex Spouse Is Denied "Spouse" Status Under the INA
A party has an equal protection claim if he faces discrimina-
tion resulting from an act by law.163 Such is true in the case of
a U.S. citizen who seeks to bring his foreign same-sex spouse into
the United States on the basis of the partner's status as a spouse.
Under the Adams decision, the U.S. citizen faces discrimination
because his spouse will not be considered a "spouse" for immigra-
tion purposes, even though the foreign spouse of a heterosexual
person would be considered a "spouse." Furthermore, this dis-
crimination results from the immigration law passed by Congress
and interpreted by the courts to exclude same-sex spouses; thus, it
meets the requirement that the discriminatory action be govern-
mental. A U.S. citizen in this situation would, therefore, have a
valid equal protection claim.
3. A Homosexual's Equal Protection Claim Should Receive
Heightened Scrutiny
a. Excluding Same-Sex "Spouses" Is Intentional
Discrimination
An equal protection claim is entitled to heightened scrutiny
review if the body passing the law had the intent to discriminate
161. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
162. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
163. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
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and the discrimination affects a suspect or quasi-suspect class or a
fundamental right."6 When a court refuses to recognize a same-
sex spouse, there is intent to discriminate because the denial of
"spouse" status is based solely upon sexual preference. The gross
statistical disparity in the number of same-sex versus the number
of heterosexual spouses who qualify for immigration reflects the
intent to discriminate-no same-sex spouses are granted "spouse"
status. Consequently, the discrimination against homosexuals is
more than an incidental result of discrimination based on a
characteristic other than sexual preference; rather, it discriminates
against homosexuals specifically.
b. Homosexuals Should Be Considered a Suspect or
Quasi-Suspect Class
In Watkins v. U.S. Army,165 the court found that homosexu-
als meet the requirements to be considered a suspect class, against
whom discriminatory legislation must be accorded strict scrutiny
review."6  Although this finding was overturned on appeal,
homosexuals should, nevertheless, be considered a suspect or
quasi-suspect class. To be considered a suspect class, a group must
meet the indicia of suspectness that the Supreme Court evaluates
in finding certain groups to be suspect.67 Several such factors
have been recognized.
The first factor is a history of discrimination against the
group."6  Homosexuals have historically faced extensive dis-
crimination. In Watkins, the court noted that "homosexuals have
historically been the object of pernicious and sustained hostili-
ty,' 69 and that "lesbians and gays have been the object of some
of the deepest prejudice and hatred in American society.'
170
Furthermore, discrimination is reflected in the history of the INA
itself-the notion that being homosexual means that a person has
164. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 457 (1988).
165. 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), opinion withdrawn on reh'g, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990).
166. Id. at 1349.
167. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 553 (1989).
168. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
169. Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1345, citing Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S.
1009 (1985).
170. Id., citing High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, 668 F.
Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
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a "psychopathic personality" or "mental disease or. defect.' 71
Another, more current example of discrimination against homosex-
uals is the military policy of refusing to allow homosexuals to serve
in the armed forces. Although "mitigated" today by the "don't
ask, don't tell" policy, which allows homosexuals to serve only if
they keep their sexual preference secret, the discriminatory nature
of the military policy is apparent.
The second factor that the Supreme Court examines to
determine whether a group qualifies as a suspect class is whether
the group is politically powerless, so that the group lacks an
effective voice or representation in the political process.
172
Traditionally, this factor has required a determination that the
group is a "discrete and insular minority. '
1 73
Homosexuals meet this standard. It is true that gays have
never categorically been denied the right to vote, as has been the
case with other groups found to be suspect classes. Another
component of political powerlessness, however, is the ineffec-
tiveness of the representation of the group's interests achieved
through the exercise of the right to vote. In this respect, homosex-
uals' votes alone are insufficient to adequately represent their
interests: "even if the majority of gay and lesbian people suddenly
opened up about their sexuality, because of both moral disapprov-
al of homosexuality and the fact that gay men and lesbians
constitute a minority of the population, discriminatory practices
would probably continue.' ' 174 For example, the voters of Colora-
do passed an initiated amendment to the Colorado Constitution
which forbade all state agencies from enacting any legislation
which was protective of homosexuals. 175 The vocal opposition of
homosexuals in Colorado was insufficient to prevent the passing of
this amendment.1
71
In addition, "most gay men and lesbians are not likely to risk
publicly calling for changes in policies ... [b]ecause people who
171. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
172. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.14, reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982).
173. Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1348, citing United States v. Carolene Prod., 304 U.S. 144,
152-53 n.4 (1938).
174. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, at 57.
175. Evans v. Colorado, 1993 WL 518586, at 1 (Colo. Dec. 14, 1993).
176. The Colorado District Court found that the amendment violated the "fundamental
right to participate equally in the political process" and, consequently, found the
amendment to be unconstitutional. Id. at 13.
792 [Vol. 16:763
Preferential Immigration Status
openly declare their homosexuality face harassment, loss of
employment, and social ostracism."'" Furthermore, very few
people elected to public office are openly homosexual, because
acknowledging their sexual preference and exposing themselves to
societal prejudice significantly reduces homosexuals' chances of
election.'78 Thus, homosexuals are politically powerless because
their interests are inadequately represented by their votes.
The third factor that the Supreme Court examines is the
immutability of the characteristic that defines the group.
79
Although the immutability of sexual preference has not been
absolutely determined, scientific research suggests that homosexu-
ality is immutable because sexual preference is not something that
people are able to change." For example, therapists' attempts
to substitute heterosexual activity for their patients' homosexual
activity have had only limited success, and have led to the
conclusion that homosexuality is not an illnessl"' that can be
treated and cured.
Additionally, the Watkins court noted that the Supreme Court
has not always required immutability to designate a class as sus-
pect.'82 In other cases, courts have not required a strict defini-
tion of immutability.183  For example, a light-skinned black
person might pass for white or have pigment injections to achieve
that appearance."8 The Watkins court concluded that immuta-
bility requires only that changing the trait "would involve great
difficulty, such as requiring a major physical change or a traumatic
change of identity."'85  If the trait at issue is "so central to a
person's identity that it would be abhorrent for government to
penalize a person for refusing to change" the trait, it is immuta-
177. Id.
178. Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect
Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1304 n.96 (1985) [hereinafter The Constitutional
Status of Sexual Orientation].
179. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
180. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, at 57-58.
181. Coleman, Changing Approaches to the Treatment of Homosexuality, in HOMOSEXU-
ALITY: SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL ISSUES 81-88 (W. Paul et al. eds.,
1982), cited in SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 75, at 58.
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ble.'" Therefore, homosexuals' inability to change their sexual
preference would meet the immutability requirement.
A fourth factor that the Supreme Court examines to deter-
mine whether a class is suspect is whether the discrimination
against the group is grossly unfair or otherwise inconsistent with
the dictates of the Equal Protection Clause."8  To make this
determination, the Court looks at whether the class is defined by
a trait unrelated to the "ability to perform or contribute to
society,"'" in addition to factors one and three above (discrimi-
nation and immutability). 9 Clearly, sexual orientation does not
affect a person's ability to contribute to society. For example,
homosexual couples are among the highest income-earners: "[g]ay
men have emerged as one of the richest and least-tapped markets
in America."' 9
Because homosexuals meet the indicia of suspectness required
for categorization as a suspect class, and because the discrimination
against them is intentional, a homosexual's claim that he is being
denied the equal protection of the laws because his spouse from a
valid marriage is not considered a "spouse" for purposes of
immigration should receive strict scrutiny review. The Supreme
Court is reluctant, however, to recognize new classifications as
suspect. Consequently, where the Court has overtly or covertly
identified certain quasi-suspect classes, discrimination against these
classes receives intermediate, but not strict scrutiny.'9' This level
of scrutiny is less demanding than the strict scrutiny standard
applied to true suspect classes, but more demanding than the
"basic requirement of minimum rationality" applied to non-suspect
classes." In High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security
Clearance Office,93 the District Court for the Northern District
of California found gays to be a quasi-suspect class, and in-
validated the government's policy of requiring homosexuals who
186. Id.
187. Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1346.
188. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
189. Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1346.
190. FRANK BROWNING, THE CULTURE OF DESIRE: PARADOX AND PERVERSITY IN
GAY LivEs TODAY 191 (1993).
191. TRIBE, supra note 88, at 1610.
192. Id. at 1613.
193. 668 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd in part, vacated in part, 895 F.2d 563,
reh'g denied, 909 F.2d 375 (1990).
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applied for security clearance to undergo extended investigations
and mandatory adjudications.19'
The criteria for finding a class to be quasi-suspect differ only
slightly from those required to designate a class as suspect. A
quasi-suspect class may be found to exist when the government
chooses a classification based on "sensitive," rather than suspect,
criteria.' In designating a class as quasi-suspect, the Supreme
Court examines some factors identical to those considered in desig-
nating a class as suspect, including whether the group is a "discrete
and insular minority,"'96 and whether the characteristic is immu-
table."9 The Court has also considered the risk that a particular
classification "may serve to stereotype and stigmatize.' ' 98 The
stigma attached to being identified as a homosexual is reflected in
many ways. For example, sodomy statutes criminalize gay sexual
intercourse. Homosexuals are also denied jobs, child custody,
housing, and the right to marry. 9 Sometimes, the Court consid-
ers whether the class is responsible for its defining characteris-
tic.' ° This argument is substantially the same as that of immuta-
bility.
201
Discrimination based on gender has traditionally been
evaluated under the intermediate scrutiny standard.2' Dis-
crimination based on sexual preference, however, is inherently dif-
ferent from discrimination based on gender. Gender discrimina-
tion emphasizes whether a person is male or female. In contrast,
discrimination based on sexual preference disregards whether a
person is male or female because it applies to men and women
equally. For example, neither an all-male nor an all-female
married couple would be considered to have the necessary spousal
relationship required for family immigration under the first prong
of the Adams test as it is currently applied.
The requirements for finding a classification to be quasi-
suspect are virtually the same as those required to find a classifica-
194. Id. at 1369-70, 1377.
195. TRIBE, supra note 88, at 1613.
196. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 179-86 and accompanying text.
198. TRIBE, supra note 88, at 1615. Consequently, the Court has applied an
intermediate standard of review to legislation that discriminates based on gender. Id.
199. The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation, supra note 178, at 1285-86.
200. TRIBE, supra note 88, at 1615.
201. See supra notes 179-86 and accompanying text.
202. Id.
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tion to be truly suspect. Homosexuals meet the indicia required
to find a group to be truly suspect, and, consequently, discrimina-
tion against them should be reviewed under the strict scrutiny
standard. If the Court refuses to identify homosexuals as a suspect
class, however, they should certainly be considered as a quasi-
suspect class. Under this classification, legislation discriminating
against them would still be entitled to evaluation under a height-
ened scrutiny standard, which would be more likely to protect their
interests than the minimum rationality standard applied to
unprotected classes.
c. The Refusal To Recognize Same-Sex Spouses Should Be
Given Strict Scrutiny Review Because It Discriminates
Against a Fundamental Right
Even if the court does not recognize homosexuals as a suspect
or quasi-suspect class, denial of spouse status for same-sex couples
should receive strict scrutiny review on another basis. The
Supreme Court has recognized marriage as a fundamental right,
the denial of which requires that the action causing the denial be
subjected to strict scrutiny.' 3 A homosexual person can marry
independently of his right to bring his "spouse" into the United
States. Nevertheless, if a citizen is unable to live with his spouse
of a legal marriage because courts will not recognize his partner as
a "spouse" for immigration purposes, that citizen is denied the
right to marry, with all its associated benefits, that heterosexual
citizens receive. Thus, the denial of his fundamental right to marry
is entitled to strict scrutiny review.
V. CONCLUSION
Foreign-born same-sex spouses should be granted the same
benefits under U.S. immigration law that foreign-born opposite-sex
spouses receive, namely, the classification as "spouses" under the
INA. When a U.S. court last faced this issue twelve years ago in
Adams v. Howerton, it held that a marriage must be valid under
state law and that Congress must have intended for the spouse to
be a "spouse" within the INA for that person to be granted
"spouse" status under the Act. The court found it unnecessary to
evaluate the validity of the same-sex marriage at issue because the
203. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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court concluded that Congress did not intend for the INA to
include same-sex spouses.
The basis for the court's decision in Adams is no longer valid.
A foreign marriage between two people of the same sex could be
held valid under state law for several reasons: (1) marriage is a
fundamental right; (2) marriages that are valid where celebrated
are traditionally valid everywhere, unless contrary to public policy,
and public policy reasons do not support failing to recognize same-
sex marriages; and (3) homosexual couples have the same privacy
interest in this aspect of their lives as heterosexual couples.
In addition, a same-sex spouse could qualify as a "spouse"
under the INA. Since the Adams decision, Congress has repealed
the section of the INA that categorically excluded homosexuals
from immigration and, thus, suggested to the Adams court that
homosexuals were not to be considered "spouses" within the Act.
The section was repealed because Congress felt that it was no
longer reasonable to discriminate against homosexuals on this
basis. Thus, a court could conclude that same-sex spouses qualify
for "spouse" status, especially after considering the equal protec-
tion claims of the same-sex spouse who is a U.S. citizen.
Some fear the possible consequences of a state's recognition
of same-sex marriages, such as sham marriages or gays flocking to
a state to marry and then seeking benefits in other states.
Nevertheless, the benefits that the partners to the marriage would
receive would be no different than those to which they would be
entitled if they chose to marry a person of the opposite sex.
People do not worry about a heterosexual couple's illegitimate
reasons for marriage. Rather, opponents of same-sex marriage use
these pretenses to justify denying homosexual couples the rights to
which they are legally entitled.
Additionally, recognizing same-sex marriages would provide
benefits not just to homosexuals, but to society generally. Denying
the ability to marry legally and to obtain the benefits of marriage
does not encourage the maintenance of monogamous relationships;
yet, monogamous relationships are crucial to prevent the spread of
AIDS. Sweden acknowledged this as the purpose of its legislation
granting rights to live-in sexual relationships.2°4 Similar rights in
the United States could help control the spread of this disease.
204. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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Additionally, recognition of same-sex marriages would encourage
or even force spouses of such marriages to support any children
born to or adopted by either spouse and raised as their joint child.
Both the law and policy reasons support the recognition of
same-sex marriages generally and for immigration purposes. When
faced with a situation similar to the hypothetical above, a court
should recognize the foreign same-sex spouse as a "spouse" within
the meaning of the INA.205
Amy R. Brownstein
205. Just prior to publication of this Note, Sweden passed a law legalizing same-sex
marriages. Sweden Joins in Approving Partnership Law for Gay Couples, L.A. TIMES,
June 15, 1994, at E3. The law, which becomes effective in 1995, will grant same-sex
couples the same inheritance, tax rights, and obligations as those granted to heterosexual
married couples. Id. This recent development reflects the growing global trend toward
the recognition of homosexual rights.
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